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Observership, ‘knowing’ and semiosis 
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Abstract 
 
This article asks how future semiotic research, particularly with a 
biosemiotic orientation, will incorporate a theory of observership. The 
article take its cue from Sebeok’s (1986, 1991a, 1991b) comments on John 
Archibald Wheeler’s conception of the ‘participatory universe’ and 
attempts to explicate the relevance of Wheeler’s (1994, 1998) philosophy 
of science for semiotics. The article argues that the quantum view of 
observership aligns with that of semiotics in that both envisage 
observation as a field of modification. The article seeks to contribute to 
recent key debates in the field on ‘knowing’ sciences on relation and 
cybersemiotics It develops some of the themes foreshadowed towards the 
end of an earlier article outlining a future orientated observership in 
contrast to a vis a tergo perspective. 
 
 
 
Bohr  Not to criticise, Margrethe, but you have a 
tendency to make everything personal. 
  
Margrethe  Because everything is personal! 
You’ve just read us all a lecture about it!  
 
Michael Frayn, Copenhagen (1998)  
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Observership is, explicitly, the key concept in the distinction between first- 
and second-order cybernetics (Glanville 2003). In semiotics, by contrast, it has 
been omnipresent but under-theorised.  Unsurprisingly, one of the planks of 
cybersemiotics (e.g. Brier 1996, 2008), a melding of second-order perspectives 
with a semiotic frame, has been the project of re-emphasizing the observer. The 
key task in such an enterprise is not so much accounting for ‘observer bias’ in the 
apprehension of ‘reality’ – that is, acknowledging ‘faults’ in an unstable 
observer’s grasp of a supposedly stable phenomenon – but, rather, the recognition 
that ‘reality’ is inherently unstable because it cannot exist as a settled 
phenomenon divorced from observership. More pointedly, in any reality there is 
semiosis: that is, relations between (semiosic) objects, including observers, will 
involve such processes as anticipation or ‘intention’ which are themselves not 
detectable otherwise than by a semiosic system. Cybersemiotics mission is to 
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account for such semiosis. Put briefly, it is “an attempt to conduct a constructive 
philosophy of science addressing an interdisciplinary scientific problem on the 
border of philosophy and science” (Brier 2008: 149) with the aim of 
understanding the role of the embodied mind in cognition and communication 
(Brier 2008: 4). In contrast to the guiding ideas of information processing and 
rationality, as well as the object-based view of science in which a honed method 
accounts for stable and definable physical phenomena, cybersemiotics addresses 
life not just in its physical occurrence within material, energetic, and 
informational systems, but life as it subsists through qualia, consciousness and the 
inner world of first person experiences (Brier 2008: 363). It is cybersemiotics that 
has most consistently pursued the implicit problem of observership in semiosis, 
proceeding from the understanding that the constituents of human knowing do not 
consist solely of the coupling of a material observation instrument and a physical 
object of observation. Rather, the ‘knowing’ of all species in a cybersemiotic 
frame involves a dynamic interaction of observed and observer. 
 
A concern with the domain of observer-observed interaction has thus been central 
to semiotics and second-order cybernetics, only relatively lately having been 
articulated in cybersemiotics. Yet the provenance of this concern is to be found in 
the quantum revolution in physics. In a well-known quote, Einstein outlined the 
consequences of the quantum perspective for physics: 
 
Physics is an attempt conceptually to grasp reality as it is thought independently of 
its being observed. In this sense one speaks of ‘physical reality’. In pre-quantum 
physics there was no doubt as to how this was to be understood. In Newton's theory 
reality was determined by a material point in space and time; in Maxwell's theory, 
by the field in space and time. In quantum mechanics it is not so easily seen. If one 
asks: does a ψ-function of the quantum theory represent a real factual situation in 
the same sense in which this is the case of a material system of points or of an 
electromagnetic field, one hesitates to reply with a simple ‘yes’ or ‘no’; why? What 
the ψ-function (at a definite) time asserts, is this: What is the probability for finding 
a definite physical magnitude q (or p) in a definitely given interval, if I measure it 
at time t? The probability is here to be viewed as an empirically determinable, 
therefore certainly as a ‘real’ quantity which I may determine if I create the same 
ψ-function very often and perform a q measurement each time. But what about the 
single measured value of q? Did the respective individual system have this q-value 
even before this measurement? To this question there is no definite answer within 
the framework of the theory, since the measurement is a process which implies a 
finite disturbance of the system from the outside; it would therefore be thinkable 
that the system obtains a definite numerical value for q (or p) the measured 
numerical value, only through the measurement itself. 
       (Einstein (1949: 94) 
Hopefully, this comment of Einstein’s is self-explanatory. It demonstrates that the 
act of ‘knowing’ is not simply a matter of neutrality whereby one entity 
assimilates the details of another through stable, untrammelled, unidirectional 
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information processing. Far from it. Instead, the seemingly disinterested act of 
measurement is found to affect the ‘nature of reality’. 
 
 
Affecting the ‘nature of reality’ 
 
The idea that measurement itself has impact on what is being measured is not a 
difficult one to grasp. For example, it is increasingly reported that the growing 
popularity of whale watching has had an effect on the natural behaviour of 
whales, no matter how discreet or environmentally sound in planning the activity 
is (Lusseau: 2014). In baking, to take another example, measuring precisely with a 
cook’s thermometer the temperature in an oven is likely to change the temperature 
as the oven door is opened to insert the thermometer. In fact, these examples are 
close to the common idea of observer bias or what Barrow and Tipler (1986: 2) 
call the “selection effect”. In an earlier period of semiotics, the work of Charles 
Morris distinguished between the ‘designative’, ‘appraisive’ and ‘prescriptive’ 
properties of signs, seeing in the first the signification of observable properties “of 
the environment or of the actor” (1964: 4). More recently, (postmodern) 
ethnography has grappled with the observer-generated nature of its data (Clifford 
1986, Marcus and Fischer 1986). Famously, Geertz called for a ‘thick description’ 
(Geertz 1993 [1973]) in anthropology, a semiotically inflected approach to 
fieldwork and cultural analysis in which the depth of interpretability of human 
artefacts and practices is given its due. As such, the ‘thin’ descriptions of those 
ethnographers who do not recognize the semiotic richness of their objects, or the 
effect on the objects of observing them, are failures to take into account the role of 
the observer or, more pointedly, they are ethnocentric. Similarly, in 
constructivism and second-order cybernetics (Maturana 1988, von Foerster 1984), 
Von Foerster (2003: ix) asks: 
 
How do I know the objects? Where are they? Of course, I can reconfirm or 
establish a rich connection with an object by touching or by smelling it or talking 
about it, and so I had the idea to make the object a representation of the activity or 
behavior of the observer, instead of the passive being looked or just sitting there. 
(von Foerster, 2003: ix) 
 
In all of these, the relationship of causality in the observer-observed couplet is, to 
a great extent, played down in comparison to the cue that is offered by quantum 
physics. Barrow and Tipler (1986: 4) make a distinction between “those features 
of the Universe whose appearance depends on anthropocentric selection” and 
“those features which are genuinely determined by the action of physical laws”. 
Yet, as Cariani (1998: 365), in Morrisian mode, suggests, any scientific modelling 
relies not on straightforward instrument-object observership but must comprise 
rule-governed syntactic operations on signs (the formal, mathematical part of the 
model), semantic relations between the signs and the physical world (the 
measurement part of the model) and pragmatic relations impinging on the signs 
(the evaluation of which enables the formulation of predictive goals, the ultimate 
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objective of scientific observership). The distinction between physical laws and 
human error may be less clear cut, then, than Barrow and Tipler allow. 
 
Nevertheless, “anthropocentric selection” is associated with what is often 
understood as a weak version of the Anthropic Principle originating in the works 
of Carter (1974) and Dicke (1961), developed also by Wheeler (1994). 
Conversely, Carter (1974) also posited a strong version of the principle in which 
the reason for the universe developing in the way that it did was precisely to allow 
observership. A similar distinction obtains between the ‘quantum reality’ that is 
the focus of Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle (1949) and the more general 
‘observer effect’ where objects are directly observed. The former can only 
properly be explicated with reference to complex and precise calculations of mass 
and velocity, as the strong Anthropic Principle is built on similar calculations 
regarding the expansion of the universe. Upon these calculations rest a number of 
debates about the possible conclusion that there is a God-like designer, there are 
many universes, or both - as in the work of the Canadian philosopher, John Leslie 
(1983, 1988, 1992, 1996) who was much exercised by the possibility that “living 
beings could see only universes whose characteristics were life-permitting” (1988: 
269). Unfortunately, the technical expertise required to address the detail of 
quantum observership in the current article is lacking. However, in considering 
observership in semiotics, particularly as it is inflected in the ‘knowing’ science 
exemplified by biosemiotics and demanded by cybersmiotics, it is clear that there 
is a broad affinity between the strong Anthropic Principle, quantum reality and the 
semiotic observer. This affinity lies in the observer-observed relationship taking 
place in a field that is modified by the observation. 
 
 
The field of semiosis: signs, observership and modification 
 
In some ways, the act of modification in semiotics seems counter-intuitive or 
somehow not characteristic of how signs have traditionally been considered to 
function. When a sign is seen to stand for something – aliquid stat pro aliquo – 
and an analyst can elucidate that ‘standing for’ in the manner of the semantic 
aspect of Cariani’s (1998) description of modelling, there is an act of uncovering 
in which the analyst maintains a position of vaunted neutrality. Yet, when an 
analyst is dealing with a concept of sign in which there is a more complicated set 
of factors than a one-to-one link – for example, what the sign is for, what it 
becomes, what its potential of transformation is, what it is for the analyst at the 
moment of encounter, what its relation to other signs is, what it contributes to the 
modelling of the world by the species using it, what resonance it has for the 
specific sign user – then the claim of neutrality is placed in crisis (the pragmatic 
element of modelling as identified by Cariani). The one-to-one link involves, of 
course, two elements; when a third element enters into the relation – as it always 
must with signs – there is another scenario. Such a formulation of the sign arises, 
historically, most clearly from Poinsot, whose subsequent influence on Peirce has 
been amply demonstrated in the work of John Deely (see Cobley 2009). The 
formulation insists that it is the entire relation of elements in a sign that constitute 
a sign rather than just the representational or semantic “relation” between some 
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vehicle and some terminus as has been traditionally assumed in the tradition 
which has followed Bréal (1900), Ogden and Richards (1923) and the 
semiological tradition.  A simpler way to put this is to state that the sign is a 
thoroughly contextual phenomenon – not just in the sense that it relates to a 
situation; rather, it negotiates between mind-independent being (known as ens 
reale by the Latins) and mind-dependent being (ens rationis) (Deely 2001: 729). 
It should also be remembered that relation amounts not just to the referentiality of 
the sign but also, quite obviously, to the ‘sign user’ plus motivation and interest. It 
is motivation and interest which dictate the shape of mind-dependent being. 
Furthermore, there is not just motivation in the use of signs; in addition, there is 
motivation and interest, however these might be configured, in the discovery of 
‘further signs’. That is, there is motivation and interest in ‘analysis’ and in 
research. What this entails, of course, is the recognition that research is often 
ruled by the necessary constituent of observership. Put another way, any research, 
because it involves sign use, will oscillate between mind-independent being (with 
its motivation and interest arising from the specific experience of the user) and 
mind-independent being (with the consciousness that there is a world out there 
which is, nevertheless, filtered through motivation and interest).  
 
Human semiosis is the field constituted by movements to and fro between the 
mind-dependent and the mind-dependent. Moreover, in being characterized by 
movements, that field changes with the observership or recognition of each 
semiosic act. Yet, typically, semiotic analysis of the world, both as research in 
itself and figured as part of supposedly broader research projects and 
methodologies beyond semiotics as a disciplinary field, has often been fixated on 
the possibly that artefacts and close readings of them, in one-to-one relations, will 
yield ineluctable answers. This is especially true of, among others, 
(post)Saussurean analysis and its structural investigations of langue/parole or 
paradigms/syntagms; Barthesian myth criticism - exposing the construction of 
paroles from langue (exposing ideology) – which was publicly abandoned by 
Barthes in 1971 (a fact overlooked by his most slavish followers - see Barthes 
1977); and Lévi-Strauss’ avowedly reductionist anthropology (1977, 1987) which 
unified the ‘primitive’ and the civilized with reference to a near-universal 
‘structure of the mind’. One problem is that such analysis evinced the tendency to 
break up artefacts, to focus on the sign rather than semiosis. Indeed, this is not 
uncharacteristic of some of the ways in which the work of Peirce has been used 
(most famously by Jakobson 1965), placing emphasis on a few of the signs in the 
Decalogue rather than on the action of semiosis as a field. Poststructuralism 
(espoused by “the postmodernists so-called” – Deely 2003) went to tortuous and 
unnecessary lengths to demonstrate that semiologically-orientated semiotics made 
the fatal mistake of focusing on the sign in a static union with an object, 
promoting particularly the fallacy of ‘representation’. Yet, poststructuralism itself 
proceeded to erroneously concentrate on the sign vehicle as simultaneously some 
kind of slippery, autonomous trickster and as an instrument and symbol of tyranny 
akin to the fasces. In each case, theoretical convenience dictated interest in 
seemingly isolatable entities rather than on the more troublesome and messy 
implications of relation in the sign. Observership, in the shadow of the synchronic 
turn to the sign-object relationship, might therefore have been assumed to have 
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been de-emphasized in sign study. Along with this, the sense of semiosis as a 
modifiable field was lost. Uncovering the nature of semiotics’ conceptualising of 
the observer, a conceptualising that is made possible especially with the 
emergence of biosemiotics and with the guidance of cybersemiotics, is the main 
purpose of this paper. 
 
 
Peirce, Sebeok and Wheeler’s observership 
 
Despite early forays by Morris, observership in semiotics – certainly in the 
second-order sense under discussion here – was first seriously posited as an issue 
for sign study by Thomas A. Sebeok. In addition to organising a special session 
dedicated to observership at the Semiotic Society of America meeting in 1982, of 
which contributions by von Uexküll (1983) and Williams (1983) are extant, 
Sebeok sought to incorporate the cosmological perspectives of John A. Wheeler 
into semiotics (Sebeok 1991a, 1991b). Not only did Sebeok see in Wheeler’s 
work the ‘Jourdain effect’, in which Wheeler’s thinking was always ‘semiotic’ in 
orientation without knowing it, Sebeok also recognized Wheeler’s oeuvre as 
cognate with Peirce’s cosmology and, in particular, Peirce’s (CP 5.316) future-
orientated community of ‘knowing’. Sebeok writes (1991c: 48) that “At the heart 
of Wheeler's ‘meaning-circuit model’ of existence lies the postulation that 
semiosis” rests on the “community of observer-participants”. He adds (1991b: 84) 
 
In this model, meaning before the advent of life must, of course, be founded on 
construction: ‘Only by [life's] agency is it even possible to construct the universe of 
existence or what we call reality’ (1986:314). In sum, in Wheeler's grand 
conception, physics is the offspring of semiosis, ‘even as meaning is the child of 
physics’. 
 
Ultimately, Sebeok sees the strong version of the Anthropic Principle as 
consonant with semiotics, particularly “Wheeler's suggestion that the fundamental 
physical constants, the nuclear and cosmological parameters, and others, are 
constrained by the unbudging requirement that life evolve, and that these 
constants are altered by our consciousness of them”. Put briefly, “life modifies the 
universe to meet its needs, and accomplishes this by means of sign action” 
(Sebeok 1991c: 135). During the observership session of the SSA in 1982, Sebeok 
mentioned to Brooke Deely that “Every time you look at the sun you affect its 
rays to an infinitesimal degree” (Williams 2017).  Within these general 
statements, Sebeok aligns himself with a Wheelerian view of observership that 
will be unpacked in the paragraphs that follow and which, it will be argued here, 
is consonant with the idea of semiosis as a field of observership where 
modification is inherent. 
 
In addition to its complexity, Wheelerian observership demands to be unpacked 
because Sebeok’s cue to consider physics as meaning in which an observer is 
implicated, an act of co-participatory creation, has not really been acknowledged 
(a noble exception being Merrell 2011 who demonstrates the influence on Sebeok 
of twentieth-century physics, especially Wheeler). Nor has it been developed. 
This is not surprising since Wheeler’s voluminous writings on physics are 
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formidable for non-specialist and specialist alike, despite the fact that they bear 
the substance of his notions of the participant-observer and the participatory 
universe. However, the publication in the 1990s of Wheeler’s 1953-1991 writings 
on philosophy of science (Wheeler 1994), as well as his autobiography (Wheeler 
with Ford 1998), offers some succour to those who would take Sebeok’s cue to 
understanding the semiotic endeavour. Reasoning at the quantum level, but in a 
manner susceptible of translation to other levels, it becomes increasingly apparent 
why Wheeler’s perspective on observership is congenial to semiotics and 
pragmaticism. Chiefly, Wheeler is concerned with physics not just as 
mathematically ‘objective’ but as ‘meaning’ or ‘significance’. His formulation 
regarding observership effectively hinges on two points regarding the relative 
positions of observers. The first, requiring only the most rudimentary 
understanding of relativity, is that “The observer is elevated from ‘observer’ to 
‘participator’ . . . The position (or momentum) of an object only acquires a useful 
meaning through the participatory act of observation” (1994: 25). In short, 
relativity entails that the observer is ‘active’ in enacting that relativity. Second 
comes the question “Is the architecture of existence such that only through 
‘observership’ does the universe have a way to come into being?” (1994: 26). It 
should be clear that these statements constitute neither relativism (cognitive or 
cultural) nor constructivism. Certainly, they differ from the constructivist position 
despite their apparent alignment with this position at first sight. Maturana 
arguably the leading bioconstructivist and one of the figures debated in 
cybersemiotics, contends that 
 
cognition has no content and does not exist outside the effective actions that 
constitute it. This is why nothing exists outside the distinctions of the observer. 
That the physical domain of existence should be our limiting cognitive domain 
does not alter this. Nature, the world, society, science, religion, the physical space, 
atoms, molecules, trees..., indeed all things, are cognitive entities, explanations of 
the praxis or happening of living of the observer, and as such, as this very 
explanation, they only exist as a bubble of human actions floating on nothing. 
Everything is cognitive, and the bubble of human cognition changes in the 
continuous happening of the human recursive involvement in co-ontogenic and co-
phylogenic drifts within the domains of existence that he or she brings forth in the 
praxis of living. 
 
      (Maturana , 1988: 40) 
 
The difference between Wheeler’s and Maturana’s positions should now appear 
stark. The latter’s rhetoric works to deny the existence of distinctions outside of 
the observer – everything is cognitive. By contrast, Wheeler is unconcerned with 
cognition and consciousness. Instead, he suggests that  
 
the universe is a ‘self-excited circuit’ – a system whose existence and whose 
history are determined by measurements. By ‘measurement’ I do not mean an 
observation carried out by a human or human-designed instrument – or by an 
extraterrestrial intelligence, or even by an ant or an amoeba. Life is not a necessary 
part of this equation. A measurement, in this context, is an irreversible act in which 
uncertainty collapses to certainty. It is the link between the quantum and classical 
worlds, the point where what might happen – multiple paths, interference patterns, 
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spreading clouds of probability – is replaced by what does happen: some event in 
the classical world, whether the click of a counter, the activation of an optic nerve 
in someone’s eye, or just the coalescence of a glob of matter triggered by a 
quantum event. 
 
   (Wheeler with Ford, 1998: 337)   
 
Moreover, he states that “the essential feature of an act of ‘measurement’ is 
amplification from the quantum thing observed to the classical thing doing the 
observing, which need have nothing to do with human intervention or human 
consciousness” (ibid.: 343). Within this is a simple point which bears repeating: 
that observership does not always entail humans and does not exclusively involve 
living beings.  
 
What matters to Wheeler is not so much the anthropocentrism of observation so 
much as the scale involved and the measuring device in observation. This is 
summed up in the Sebeokian title of his famous essay: ‘Not consciousness but the 
distinction between the probe and the probed as central to the elemental quantum 
act of observation’.  He adds (ibid.: 330), 
 
No matter what the uncertainties of the small-scale world, no matter how chaotic 
the fluctuations, our knowledge of nature rests ultimately on perfectly definite, 
unambiguous observations – what we see directly or what our measuring apparatus 
tells us. How can this be? If the world ‘out there’ is writhing like a barrel of eels, 
why do we detect a barrel of concrete when we look? To put the question 
differently, where is the boundary between the random uncertainty of the quantum 
world, where particles spring into and out of existence, and the orderly certainty of 
the classical world, where we live, see and measure? 
 
The differences in what “we detect” are a matter of modelling. Human modelling 
is often summed up as ‘language’, but the critical point is that the human Umwelt 
consists of the full potential of verbal and nonverbal semiosis accruing to the 
species (Sebeok 1988). Human measuring devices, the non-human ‘observers’, 
should therefore be considered as the ‘extensions’ of modelling – efficient in their 
variety and precision for many purposes, but faulty and sometimes insufficiently 
accurate when compared to the modelling of other species, terrestrial and extra-
terrestrial (if such exists). Wheeler’s questions currently consume contemporary 
semiotics – not in respect of his considerations of the cosmos but, more locally, in 
semiotics’ investigations into terrestrial nature. However, they still concern the 
point at which “The observer is elevated from 'observer' to 'participator'” 
(Wheeler: 1977: 6). Put simply, the question is: what are the consequences of the 
different apprehensions of phenomena by humans, non-human animals and 
plants? 
 
Yet, before commenting on this matter, it should be mentioned that there is 
another reason why Wheeler’s philosophy of science chimes with contemporary 
semiotics. This lies in his commitment to pragmaticist realism, a commitment that 
extends even to the act of observing; he writes: 
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So then what is ‘observership’? It is too early to answer. Then why the word? The 
main point here is to have a word that is not defined and never will be defined until 
that day when one sees much more clearly than one does now . . . how the 
observations of all participators, past, present and future, join together to define 
what we call ‘reality’. 
 
      (Wheeler ,1994: 43) 
 
With his reference to the ‘community of observers’ or ‘community of 
participators’ here, it is not surprising that Wheeler cites favourably (1994: 307) 
his philosophical forebears, Peirce, Wright and Royce. However, Wheeler’s faith 
in the path of enquiry, the route to a final interpretant, is demonstrated not just in 
his insistence on the accumulation of observations but also in his comment on the 
‘tree that fell in the forest’, the unobserved event beyond specific cognition and 
consciousness. Wheeler insists that such an event leaves “a fallout of physical 
evidence so near at hand and so rich that a team of up-to-date investigators can 
establish what happened beyond all doubt” (1994: 305). 
 
For Wheeler, then, there is no such thing as an ‘impossibility’ of knowing as a 
consequence of, for humans, consciousness and species-specific cognition. 
Rather, the very fact that the origin of the universe is not subject to a private 
judgment means that public judgment (science) -  ‘one world’ out of many 
observer-participants (1994: 295) - is directly required even in determining 
origins: 
 
One does not need to know Maxwell thermodynamics to perceive a thunderbolt; 
and one does not have to trace out the unbelievably many ties of ‘observership’ 
with the deepest questions of knowledge, meaning and quantum theory to accept 
willingly or unwillingly – but accept – the strange sense in which observation now 
participates in defining the reality of the past: direct involvement of observership in 
genesis  
 
(Wheeler 1994: 43).  
 
As Sebeok (1991b: 84) states, the various connecting phases of history in physics 
amount to a demand for meaning, thus “meaning before the advent of life must, of 
course, be founded on construction”. These are, without doubt, far-reaching 
pronouncements and demonstrably consonant with semiotic – especially Peircean 
– perspectives on the practice of science and the process of knowing (see, for 
example, Brier 2017). 
 
 
Observership and cognition 
 
Yet, there are obvious limitations to Wheeler’s perspective in the building of a 
worldview or philosophy of science, certainly of the sort envisaged by 
cybersemiotics. As Brier (2017) points out, the participatory perspective 
adumbrated by Wheeler is radically undermined by the fact that the (public) 
observation experiments that he projects are carried out within the frame of the 
10 
 
traditional instrument-object relations that characterize much scientific research. 
Wheeler’s participatory universe, Brier points out, rests on an objective 
information-theoretical concept based on the ‘bit’ or what Bateson would call “a 
difference that makes a difference” (Brier 2017). Thus, the participatory universe 
perspective has more in common with an information processing paradigm than 
with more qualitative, first-person accounts of cognition and observation.  
 
It needs to be made clear, therefore, that the vicissitudes of cognition – the qualia 
and feelings that perfuse ‘knowing’ – do not ‘get in the way’ of observership in 
the manner of ‘bias’ and suchlike. More aptly, first-person accounts will assert 
that cognition is part and parcel of observership. Of course, that is easier said than 
done. In the play, Copenhagen, which provides the epigram for the current article 
and was much loved by Sebeok towards the end of his life, science is constantly 
presented in terms of the ‘personal’. This is not to say that the drama revolves 
around the humanist chestnut of individual choice; rather, in its speculation about 
why Werner Heisenberg went to meet Niels Bohr in 1941 and what they said at 
their meeting, the play is concerned with the possibilities of interpretation in 
science as well as social life. Did the meeting take place for the purposes of 
rekindling a friendship, to play out aspects of an Oedipal scenario, to discuss 
physics, to contribute to a Nazi nuclear bomb, to avoid contributing to a Nazi 
bomb? These are among the questions that the play raises, along with a range of 
first-person, felt experiences that may be social, historical, political, 
psychological, existential, familial and so forth. The play reminds the audience 
that, from Einsteinian relativity onwards, what is to be understood as the universe 
is a result of measurement by the human. As a theatrical narrative, with all the 
possibilities it evokes in live performance, Copenhagen presents the human drama 
of the “difference that makes a difference” and the Wheelerian derivation of “It 
from bit”. At present, arts such as drama are, perhaps, better placed to recast 
quasi-quantitative measurement with a qualitative overtone. While cybersemiotics 
points to modes of ‘knowing’ bound to first-person attributes and suggests a path 
to take with regard to augmenting Wheeler’s information-shackled conception of 
observership, it is too early to predict just how it might be possible to conceive of 
a participatory universe that involves not only a reliance on measurement but also 
the observer’s constitutive ‘baggage’ – feelings, emotions, individual physico-
cognitive development, and so forth, as well as that observer’s evolutionary 
continuity and co-habitation with other animals. 
 
Bearing in mind these caveats, however, and being mindful not to let the baby be 
thrown out with the bathwater, the issue for consideration now is the extent to 
which Wheeler’s statements clearly supervene on arguments at a quantum and 
cosmological level. In consonance with the trajectory of contemporary semiotics 
(including cybersemiotics) and its embrace of cognitive and affective issues, some 
very preliminary sketch marks of a first-person observership can also be 
presented. Yet these proceed from the observation that Sebeok seems to imply 
that Wheeler’s formulation of the ‘participatory universe’ could be placed at the 
heart of the project of semiotic research – research, that is, into every spectacular 
and quotidian facet of culture and into the lowly, most basic aspects of nature. 
Notwithstanding the absence of accounting for the full range of cognition in 
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Wheeler’s view, what would semiotic research with an awareness of participant-
observership be like?  
 
 
Marking observership in semiotic research 
 
There are numerous examples of empirical research in semiotics, but Bouissac’s 
(2010) book on circus performance contains some pronouncements on the status 
of observership which are apposite in respect of the argument in the current 
article. He describes (2010: 1) the build-up to one of his observations of 
performance: 
 
And here I am, more anxious than I should be, with a certain dose of elation and 
irrational excitement: I am going to the circus . . . In the taxi which rushes me 
through the rain to the hotel, I could wonder why someone who has seen a 
thousand and one circuses in his life keeps checking his watch to make sure that he 
will not miss the next show. But I do not waste time asking myself such a silly 
question. I am entirely focused on “going to the circus”, aroused by the 
forthcoming experience as if it were a date with the unknown. 
 
With such engagement – and anticipated engagement – in the spectacle, the act of 
observing described in this account is one where it is not difficult to imagine the 
mutual fecundity in the observer-observed relation. In performance, it is a 
commonplace that performers do not remain immune in their work from the mood 
of their spectators. The converse is true, too, making up what is commonly called 
‘atmosphere’. In his account, of course, Bouissac (20110: 2) notes that he can 
only ever produce what he calls a “verbal copy”, failing to capture the essence of 
the act of observership, “the miracle of the body presence of the artists and the 
colors of my emotions”. The blueprint for the text might be considered to be the 
most important piece of verbal evidence. Yet, whilst the “score” of the 
performance is absent, it is taken as “tacit” in the efficacious work between 
performers and observers. In the idea of the “tacit”, there is clearly a suggestion 
that a field exists between the performance and its observation. 
 
A coolly analytic observation would seem to deny the existence of an observer-
observed field. This recalls Wheeler’s (1977: 5) assertion that 
 
[I]t was long natural to regard the observer as in effect looking at and protected 
from contact with existence by a 10 cm slab of plate glass . . . In contrast, quantum 
mechanics teaches the direct opposite. It is impossible to observe even so 
minuscule an object as an electron without in effect smashing that slab and 
reaching in with the appropriate measuring equipment. 
 
Watching a circus performance is not identical to observing an electron. 
Nevertheless, the rational observation, where observer and observed are separated 
by a (psychological) glass slab is, for Bouissac, no more sufficient than is an 
observation which is aware of its own constructedness in culture. For him, 
emotions and qualia are crucial aspects of the process  
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Acknowledging the observer-observed field, moving the act and focus of 
observation beyond the realm of the ‘purely rational’, might also have some 
bearing on the spectacle of non-human artefacts. Combining ethological expertise 
with a contextualization of circus performance, Bouissac (2010: 44) observes 
inter-species communication between tiger and human: 
 
[H]e started to scratch Domino’s forehead while exchanging with her the signal of 
utmost trust in tiger communication that can only be transcribed as “pfrrr”, a 
transliteration that falls short of all the nuances with which it is uttered: softness, 
warmth, intensity, even passion. This is the reassuring vocal contact between her 
tigress and her cubs who readily reciprocate in similar fashion. Later, in a tiger life, 
it becomes a standard sign of comfort and affection. 
 
The question that arises from these reflections on observation in Bouissac’s circus 
book, particularly this last quote, concern the difficulty of ‘knowing’ any object 
that harbours its own kind of ‘knowing’. This is a key dilemma in semiotics and is 
also where Bouissac, and semiotics, depart from, as well as throw into relief, the 
scientistic aspect of Wheeler’s observer. One-to-one observership of emotions, 
even among well-acquainted humans, is even more difficult than the call for 
‘thick description’ suggests. Such observership of non-human species is at least 
equally challenging in research terms. And, of course, observership of inter-
species emotions, as in this last example, proliferates problems for the ‘detached’ 
observer’s rendering of the research objects. Let us consider an example involving 
observership and emotion before commenting on observership in relation to other 
species. 
 
 
Observation, rationality and emotion  
 
The disavowal of the posssiblity of accounting for motivation and purpose in the 
study of other species sometimes overlooks the fact that there is a difficulty of the 
same order in analysing the purpose of supposedly rational creatures when 
emotions cannot be placed within strict ‘cultural’ or ‘behavioural’ co-ordinates. 
Already, these concerns take this discussion far beyond the view of what 
constitutes observers for Wheeler. Furthermore, when anthropology called call for 
the aforementioned thick description (cf. Bouissac’s “verbal copy”) which would 
pay fine attention to the variegated character of the culture in which a specific 
object or practice was embedded – producing expectations that it might lead to an 
account of whether the object or practice was genuine, a parody, inconsequential, 
of great ritual importance, and so forth - uncertainty still remained. Even though 
one might glean some information on emotional states and feelings in the object 
or practice through a sense of any stated or pre-investigated importance of that 
particular object or practice, it is still easy for observers to miss the most telling 
details.  
 
An example comes from a specific, related and well-known genre of observation: 
documentary. Les Blank’s film, Burden of Dreams (1982), narrates the making of 
Werner Herzog’s feature film Fitzcarraldo (1982) and includes an account of the 
famous anecdote in which the driven Herzog prevented his leading actor and 
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friend, Klaus Kinski, from abandoning the production. Although Kinski had 
announced that he was leaving the jungle where the film was being short, Herzog 
forced him at the point of a shotgun to continue with the film. More than a decade 
and a half later, Herzog made his own documentary, My Best Fiend (1999), which 
charted his intense friendship with Kinski and the latter’s frequent and sustained 
outbursts of violence and incoherent screaming in behaviour commonly perceived 
to be psychotic. In the closing stages of the latter film, in which Kinski’s putative 
madness is apparent, Herzog re-tells the Fitzcarraldo shotgun incident. This time, 
however, there is a twist: the uncontrollable rage of Kinski which was not so 
extensively highlighted in Burden of Dreams and which was documented so 
comprehensively in My Best Fiend, is the subject of a crisis of observership. The 
first film presents the anecdote as one demonstrating Herzog’s unnatural drive, 
with Kinski as the put-upon victim of the jungle, the climate, the food and the 
director; the second film shows Kinski’s history of unreasonable behaviour. Yet 
Herzog’s telling of the shotgun incident involves a confession in which he reveals 
that the Peruvian natives who appeared in the film were certainly irked by the mad 
fury and rage of Kinski but, nevertheless, they were concerned to the point of fear 
at Herzog’s serenity – the real madness generating tension amidst work on the 
film? – during Kinski’s raving.  
 
Observing emotions, then, is a hazardous venture. This is particularly the case 
when they have different manifestations and when they are culturally specific. 
Serenity and rage not only manifest themselves differently, they also have 
different significations for different cultures. In a way, this is an easy point. 
However,  what happened in this case is that one observation (if a documentary 
film - Burden of Dreams - can be called that) featured a narrative within a 
particular context which was then recast in the context of a different observation – 
My Best Fiend – where the actions in the narrative were not only feasible, credible 
and understandable, but almost justifiable in the context (Kinski’s apparent 
madness), yet undermined by a re-telling of the narrative which allows the 
judgment of some peripheral participants in the original narrative (the Peruvian 
natives) to be foregrounded, rendering aspects of the first telling of the narrative 
(Herzog’s neurotic drive) to re-surface once more. The easy point quickly takes on 
numerous ramifications when one is compelled to observe humans in the 
knowledge that rational and cultural acts are absolutely suffused by emotional 
punctuations and that competing observations sometimes work towards one final 
version. This should be more expected than it customarily is. If human semiosis is 
the oscillation between mind-dependent and mind-independent being, then the 
emotional motivation and interest played out between the two is bound to render 
observership problematic. If one is observing other species in which the 
motivations and interests in their significations are by no means clear, then the 
task is difficult in a related, but distinct, way – not because one must give up the 
aim of ever knowing anything that is not superficial about the species but because 
one must acknowledge, as here in the example of human motivation, the 
overdetermination of observership. 
 
 
Observation across species 
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There is a direct counter-point to the theoretical modesty that is entailed in 
restraining oneself in one-to-one observation that also illustrates the need to 
understand overdetermination and to conceive of a field of semiosis. The 
‘knowing’ of species which contemporary semiotics aims to analyse, does not 
occur in a vacuum. Famously, in the case of Clever Hans (Sebeok and Rosenthal 
1981), there is the problem of anthropomorphism and the pathetic fallacy: the role 
of the human observer, the wishful thinking of the audience for Hans’ 
‘spectacles’, the projection onto him of human capability, was instrumental in the 
horse being deemed ‘Clever’. This is the lesson, too, of those research projects 
which were premised on the possibility of a language faculty in primates or other 
animals (Sebeok and Umiker-Sebeok 1981). Yet, the eschewal of 
anthropomorphism in observation of species has a behaviourist residue by which 
conclusions about interests, motivations, relations, purpose and ‘knowing’ were 
outlawed. The apotheosis of such non-anthropomorphism is to be seen in research 
which is organized around quasi-objectivity and reaching conclusions on the 
‘undecidability’ of phenomena – research which is overly cautious about 
observership. 
 
Excessive caution and habitual resort to the category of ‘undecideability’ has 
come to haunt some perspectives in the humanities. An example is that of 
posthumanism. The zoologist Hediger (1981: 5), implicitly undermining the 
tendency to undecideability, suggested, in consonance with Wheeler, that the 
pressing issue is observership and the acceptance that fields of observership 
involve modification:  
 
maybe it is a general law that through observation the observed will be altered (…) 
This means that in an animal experiment we have to work not with pure unaltered 
animal behavior, but always with the behavior of the animal plus the influence of 
the human observer.  
 
For Hediger, the animal – in this case, Clever Hans – cannot be considered as just 
‘an animal’, outside the observation process, but only as ‘an animal in interaction 
with a human’ – just as Kinski or Herzog is ‘a human in interactions with another 
human and a movie camera’. 
 
Beyond inter-species communication, to intra-specific communication of non-
human animals, there remains the problem of observership, delineated by Thure 
von Uexküll (1983: 3), by which humans can only grasp zoo- or phytosemiosis 
with anthroposemiotic concepts. Yet, that problem can be approached, according 
to von Uexküll, through acknowledging the openness of living systems whose 
homeostasis is effected by open exchange with their environment. A sign 
therefore signifies to the activity of a living system something which has 
significance for the maintenance of the homeostasis of that system. For example, 
as von Uexküll, (von Uexküll, T. 1983: 5) writes: 
 
The grasping and eating of a food object creates the conditions in the 
gastrointestinal tract for the activation of the phytosemiotic sign processes which 
signify to the intestinal cells that they must absorb needed substances. The object 
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‘food’ contains carbohydrates, fats, and proteins – the signified ‘something’ for 
these phytosemiotic signs. 
 
The process in question, then, is mutually transformative rather than a case of sign 
and object. Observing such mutuality is not simple. Although plants do not have 
specialized receptors, observers of animals have to concentrate on the way the 
environment influences the receptors of living systems (e.g. when light strikes the 
retina), taking into account that living beings are not always aware of these 
alterations in structure. Every subject can only perceive the activity of its own 
receptors, never that of the receptors of other subjects. 
 
More recently, focusing on processes of mimicry across species, Timo Maran has 
highlighted precisely these key issues of observership. He notes (2017: 49) that 
the scientistic viewpoint prescribes a “ fact-based, neutral” approach “independent 
from human psychology and biological makeup or cultural context” and that it is 
“the mistaking of the mimic for the model by humans that often initiates 
forthcoming scientific research”. A common example of this in research on 
species has been the failure of researchers to recognize mimicry in the act of 
camouflage, taking the characteristics in a camouflage situation, as stable 
constituents of the species under observation. Maran thus calls for “a concurrent 
comparative analysis of the perceptual capacities of humans and receivers” to 
avoid “biased results due to the specifics of the human Umwelt and hidden 
anthropomorphism deriving from this” (2017: 50). There is a need to consider the 
way in which “the perceptual capacities of the human observer are positioned in 
relation to the mimic, the model and the receiver of the mimicry system”. Again, 
then, in this type of observation, there is a conception of observation in which the 
signs of the animals involved, human and non-human, no matter how different 
they may be, constitute the field in which the interaction takes place. 
Acknowledging this – that genetics does not precede the field of semiosis, “that 
qualitative perception and interpretation are not just epiphenomena of the 
underlying genetic processes, but have an essential importance for organisms to 
interact with their environment” (Maran 2017: 50) – is the first step towards 
adopting the biosemiotic perspective.  
 
In terms of their bearing on the issue of observership, Maran’s assessments are 
particularly astute. He focuses not so much on the over-construing of mimicry by 
human observers witnessed in the typical cases of anthropomorphism identified 
by behaviourists. Instead, he draws attention to what different animals, with their 
own Umwelt, miss – for example, the mimicry system between red helleborine 
Cephalanthera rubra and bellflowers Campanula (the difference in colour of 
which is evident to the human but not the bee) or the fin of the male 
Haplochromis burtoni which is an example of mimicry for the female of the 
species but is difficult for the human to identify as such (2017: 51, 52). Maran 
(2017: 53) suggests that in cases where the description of mimicry systems that 
are perceptually inaccessible to humans, elaborate conceptual tools and theoretical 
models could be helpful in compensating for the Umwelt difference. Of course, 
the option to resort to nuanced descriptions and elaborate models is a feature of 
the human observer which distinguishes the species from other living systems. As 
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the ‘semiotic animal’, the human is uniquely placed among living beings by virtue 
of its ability to recognize and describe sign functioning, a point with which both 
Deely (2010) and Thure von Uexküll (1983) agree. As the latter states (1983: 7), 
“Only man can add to what he sees, h e a r s , f e e l s , and  s m e l l s  s o m e t h i n g  t hat 
he knows”. Still, in inter-species observation there is a need not only for good 
description by the human of animal signs, but also the fullest possible 
understanding of the context of the semiosis, the behaviour of the animal. This 
will reveal (von Uexküll, T. 1983: 9),  
 
[T]he contrapuntal relationship (J. v. Uexküll) between the performance of its 
effectors and the matching counter-performance of the objects. Thus the mouth of 
animals conforms to its food, the wing of birds to the air, and the fin of fishes to the 
water 
 
Effectively, ‘good’ observation has to proceed from acute knowledge of the 
environment of the observed animal. Equally important, though, as both Thure 
von Uexküll and Timo Maran make clear, is that the human observer especially 
has to know its own sign processes, the Umwelt from which the observer’s sign’s 
emanate and circulate. In the terms used hitherto in this discussion, what is called 
for is an apprehension of a field rather than just an object. 
 
Gary Shank (2010) has proposed a speculative practice, based upon the same 
principle, for learning. ‘Exopedagogy’, he suggests, can shed light on ‘knowing’ 
and the alteration that is the result of observation. Ultimately, exopedagogy would 
involve learning the boundaries of human knowledge and the limits of human 
observership from mutual teaching projects with extra-terrestrials; but, in the 
absence of extra-terrestrials, it might involve terrestrial inter-species interactions 
in which species-specific observership, as well as a testing of Umwelt overlaps, 
might be conducted through, for example: learning to inform, learning to warn (in 
fact, a subset of informing) and learning to deceive. Deception , as Shank points 
out, is crucial since it involves a mimetic signification, the purpose of the mimicry 
being to deceive other species but also, in its effectivity, demonstrating species 
overlap at the level of the iconic sign – that is, signs which signify according to 
qualities, recognized by observers or sign users, between a sign and its object. Of 
course, such mimetic overlap and deception characterises inter-cultural 
communication such as that involving the decoding of individual serenity as 
madness (see the Kinski-Herzog example, above).  
 
Again, the point to be emphasized is that the observer’s semiosis and that of the 
observed animal make up a general field of semiosis in which the interaction takes 
place. An additional point here, perhaps, is that the imperative for the observer to 
know the full reach of their semiosic capacities is not a scientistic issue. Despite 
attempts to separate the humanities from ‘the sciences’, putatively owing to their 
concern with a different class of objects, proper scientific observation cannot deny 
the status of the objects of humanities as part of the human Umwelt (cf. Cobley 
2014).  Fixation on science as the only true means of ‘knowing’ the world entails 
a belief in the primacy of scientific method and a banishing of all that cannot be 
evaluated in that method. Predictably, that includes many of the phenomena that 
dominate first-person experience and cognition - ‘feelings’, for example. 
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Mechanist or physicalist models of science, in particular, are prone to consider 
only those acts of observation that register quantitative difference as legitimate 
forms of ‘knowing’. By contrast, a number of alternative perspectives on knowing 
have emerged in recent years, suggesting that the evacuation of meaning and 
experience offered by the information science paradigm is no longer tenable. The 
most persuasive of these, as iterated earlier, is the productive fusion of philosophy 
of science, second-order cybernetics and systems theory, biosemiotics, Peirce’s 
philosophy, phenomenology and embodied cognition that makes up 
cybersemiotics (Brier 2008). The critique of traditional models of ‘knowledge’ in 
cybersemiotics, coupled with its proposals for a transdisciplinary vision, compels 
readers to view life, consciousness and cultural meaning as constituted by the 
continuities of nature and evolution (see Cobley 2010). Its insistence on embodied 
first-person consciousness, proceeding from meaningful experiences rather than 
positing an exclusive subject and object as the basis for knowledge, demonstrates 
that a comprehensive theory of observation, has to embrace the humanities and 
the arts (Brier 2008: 141). Otherwise, it will not avoid the stalemate of the sign-
object, observer-observed dichotomy in which the hyphen constitutes Wheeler’s 
thick glass slab, occluding the participants’ engagement in a field. Such a 
realization as informs cybersemiotics also underpins commitment to the diversity 
of forms of ‘knowing’ beyond scientistic materialism. It is a commitment that 
renders some dominant models of scientistic observation naïve. 
 
Thure von Uexküll targets precisely such naivety when he notes that observation 
is a matter that directly impinges on the belief that “perception is merely a passive 
process”. So, “Many scientists hold to this false belief, thinking that they can 
passively obtain a true picture of the real world if they only avoid any 
subjectivity” (von Uexküll, T. 1983: 10). He adds (1983: 10), 
 
We can call this form of observation which excludes an account of the role of the 
observer ‘naïve’ observation. By contrast, we can speak of ‘participant’ 
observation in which the observer takes the role of the observed subject and shares 
its sign processes . . .   
 
For the ‘naïve’ observer, observation is unproblematic: it is the capture of a 
passive world in which the differences of apprehension among that world’s 
inhabitants is of no scientific consequence. Put another way, the ‘naïve’ observer 
keeps nature at arm’s length and refuses to acknowledge its variegated contexts. 
‘Naïve’ observation, as second order cybernetics has been at pains to stress, does 
not incorporate the processes of ‘knowing’ in the observed into the considerations 
of the observer. 
 
 
Cybersemiotics and biosemiotics: Σ-sciences 
 
Growing partly out of ethology and the possibility of inter-species communication 
that Shank’s exopedagogy proposes to utilise in learning, cybersemiotics insists 
on the awareness of the observer in the theory of science. In particular, this 
implicates first-person experience which, as Brier (2008, 2010) demonstrates so 
forcefully, is sadly missing from so many areas of Western thought. As such, 
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cybersemiotics seems to characterize what might be called a ‘science of knowing’. 
The term comes from a paper by Kull (2009) in which he identifies “Φ-sciences” 
characterized by universal laws and quantitative methods and “Σ-sciences” 
concerned with local semioses and using qualitative research to investigate its 
’objects’.  In the latter, the point is to take into account the ‘knowing’ of both the 
organism and its environment; this is thoroughly embraced and explored while 
recognizing that humans cannot ‘know’ on behalf of the organism but can only 
produce a copy (usually verbal in scientific research, but possibly nonverbal in 
other forms of presentation such as the arts). Thus, in the science of ‘knowing’ 
called biosemiotics the theory of Umwelt is central – as such, it is remembered 
that the object is never neutral for any species. The Umwelt of an animal, for 
example, is its ‘objective’ world – not ‘subjective’ as is so often assumed – since 
all ‘objects’ (as opposed to ‘things’) are dosed with experience. As Deely (1994: 
11) shows, this conception of the animal’s ‘objective’ world compels us to be 
precise with regard to the way in which ‘objects’ contrast with ‘things’ and 
‘signs’: 
 
There are signs and there are other things besides: things which are unknown to us 
at the moment and perhaps for all our individual life; things which existed before 
us and other things which will exist after us; things which exist only as a result of 
our social interactions, like governments and flags; and things which exist within 
our round of interactions — like daytime and night — but without being produced 
exactly by those interactions, or at least not inasmuch as they are ‘ours’, i.e. 
springing from us in some primary sense. 
 
Objects for animals will be, at the least, ‘+’ or ‘-’ or ‘0’ – worth seeking out, to be 
avoided, or safely to be ignored, respectively. These basic object categories are 
obviously much extended and nuanced by human animals with their specific 
embodied cognition and with their extensive range of first-person experiences. 
Yet, in acts of ‘scientistic’ observation, with their commitment to neutrality, such 
experiences are bracketed in order to produce an object devoid of customary 
emotional, psychological, spiritual and generally personal investments. 
 
Thus, for Thure von Uexküll (1983: 11), the neutral or ‘0’ object requires 
qualification. In a scenario where a human throws a stone to ward off an 
aggressive dog, 
 
The stone lies in the objective observer’s hand as a neutral object; but it is 
transformed into a meaning-carrier as soon as it enters into a relationship 
with a subject. Because no [non-human] animal ever plays the role of an 
observer, one may assert that it never enters into a relations with a neutral 
object. Through every relationship, the neutral object is transformed into a 
meaning carrier, the meaning of which is imprinted upon it by a subject. 
 
Strictly, the neutral ‘0’ object does not exist for non-human animals; it is always 
in a relationship according to how it impinges on the animal. Where a neutral 
object in human terms has a kind of constancy for humans, non-human animals 
can only experience inconstant objects which, regardless of the fact that they are a 
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constant for humans whether lying on a path or being thrown, have characters 
determined by their meaning relevance for that animal.  
 
The concept of the neutral object is clearly very much the product of human 
observership. It exemplifies what Deely, Poinsot and Aquinas identify as integral 
to human understanding: the ability to conceive mind-independent being, to 
realize that there are signs of something and that there are ‘things’ about which we 
can only have knowledge through signs. As Thure von Uexküll (1983: 12) states, 
neutral objects keep their constancy even if they disappear from the horizon and 
this leads to the belief that neutral objects exist independently of signs and sign 
systems. This also encourages the neglect of signs as “magic formulas whose 
creative power changes our world and ourselves” (1983: 12). Naïve observership, 
of course, misses the magic - the field of semiosis. A participant observership, on 
the other hand, will result when – counter-intuitively, according to traditional 
conceptions of scientific observation – the observer becomes “emotionally 
involved” (1983: 13) with objects that entail danger, hope or despair. 
 
Observership which is based on this understanding of objects – as “what the 
things become once experienced” (Deely 1994: 12) – is indigenous to 
contemporary semiotics. It is an exemplar of pragmaticist ‘realism’ in opposition 
to “metaphysical [or naive] realism” (cf. Glasersfeld 1991) predicated on a one-to-
one relation of thing and sign. It underwrites the possibility of arriving at one 
world out of many observer-participants. Indeed, it is the placing of too much 
faith in the possibility of avoiding anthropomorphism which seems to be close to 
naive realism; blunt, ‘objectivistic’ accounts of the world as ‘undecideable’, in 
their very retreat from ‘naïve realism’, fall into the arms of Kantianism and the 
belief in an unknowable ‘ding an sich’. In semiotics, perhaps there is a need to 
acknowledge, along with Shank, that anthropomorphism can linger, or even be a 
beneficial part of scientific work. In so doing, what is observed is not ‘the natural 
world’ as a unified entity, but all the conflict that constitutes the natural world 
(e.g. between humans and other organisms), the motivation and interest that 
occurs in the natural world and the relations which obtain in signification between 
and within organisms. What is observed is a world which alters with each human 
observation, no matter how much the humanness is taken out of the equation. If 
no world can be conceived beyond that of neutral objects – stable, immutable and 
wholly independent entities - then not only are ‘the sciences’ rendered impotent, 
but so too do the arts and humanities become pursuits that are justifiable only in 
terms of their intrinsic qualities rather than by their relationships with subjects (cf. 
Cobley 2014).  
 
Following Peirce, the future entails the observer in semiotics getting as close as 
makes no difference to the ‘thing’ which is beyond the sign and the object, and 
which is at the boundary of the Umwelt: that is, ‘science as knowing’. This 
contention of Peirce regarding observership dates back at least to his essay ‘Some 
consequences of four incapacities’, a wholesale refutation of Cartesianism 
published in 1868. “[It]t follows”, writes Peirce (1868: 148), “from our own 
existence (which is proved by the occurrence of ignorance and error) that 
everything that is present to us is a phenomenal manifestation of ourselves”. 
20 
 
Although not using the term ‘observership’, Peirce nevertheless invokes the 
metaphor of the rainbow to demonstrate that there can be a “phenomenon of 
something without us”, a mind-independent being. The rainbow is a manifestation 
of both rain and sun; yet, in requiring both in order to be manifest, it is analogous 
to “we ourselves” at the moment of observership of some thing “appear as a sign”. 
The way in which observers are caught up in a field of semiosis is most eloquently 
expressed in an essay on ‘Some consequences’ by Fernando Andacht which refers 
to a potential “Möbius-like diagram of Peirce’s account of the process of 
knowledge”. He adss: “there is no clean/cut division of outside/inside, only the 
flowing action of signs on both sides” (Andacht 2014: 17). Comparing Peirce’s 
contention with that of solipsism, exemplified by William James for the purposes 
of the essay, Andacht convincingly demonstrates Peirce’s “epistemological hope” 
(2014: 19) that observership, guided by the right conditions, can bring us closer to 
what constitutes reality. Those conditions must surely involve non-naïve 
apprehensions of what is mind-independent and what is mind-dependent. The 
human use of ‘signs’, as has been seen, is characterized by partaking of both 
mind-independent and mind-dependent being, partaking of the quintessential 
personal experience that makes up ‘objects’ while also taking account of the 
‘neutrality’ that enables humans to conceive of a world that is, at once, beyond 
their experience but, at the same time, not necessarily unassimilable to their 
senses. It is on these grounds that the proposal for Σ-science, which benefits from 
a distinctive understanding of observership, proceeds. Contemporary semiotics 
generally embodies such a paradigm, but both cybersemiotics and biosemiotics, in 
their commitment to ‘knowing’ across the entire field of semiosis, will be at the 
forefront of this impetus. 
 
 
The world as it will be: Thirdness and affordance 
 
There is one additional feature of semiotic analysis and research that should be 
mentioned in relation to observership. It concerns projection, the future and what 
Peirce – a scientist engaged in predictive work (cf. CP1.26)  for most of his career 
at the US Coast and Geodetic Survey – called ‘Thirdness’. Much research, 
including anthropology in the sphere of the human sciences, has prided itself on 
reporting the ’world as it is’. Some contributors to (political) philosophy have 
attempted to promote changing the world; but, by and large, research has 
remained committed to explicating and presenting ‘fact’ about the world at the 
moment that the research took place. In the physics that Wheeler pursues, present 
‘fact’ amounts to a very small part of his object of study. He writes (Wheeler with 
Ford, 1998: 232) 
 
Moreover, it was my philosophical conviction that nature would avail 
itself of all the opportunities offered by the equations of valid theories. If 
nuclei could exist in doughnut shapes, I felt, then some of them would 
exist in such shapes. If heavy matter could be made from electrons and 
positrons only, then some heavy matter would be made of these particles. 
If matter could collapse to infinitesimal or even zero size, then matter 
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would collapse. We physicists should think about where such extreme 
behaviour might occur, and look for it. 
 
Again, Wheeler states a tenet of semiotics: that what ‘is’ or ‘has been’ should also 
be accompanied by considerations about what ‘could be’. This is another way of 
posing the importance of Thirdness in semiosis, the moderating and mediating 
factor (CP1.337, 366, 533, 2.89, 3.423. 5.104) that entails observership will be 
orientated to considerations of the future (CP1.343, 5.292). Observership is such 
that ‘fact’ will remain in doubt, no matter how strongly it is proclaimed, because it 
will be yesterday’s ‘fact’ measured with yesterday’s device in an altering situation 
of observer and observed. In a study of, for example, media uses of a specific 
media technology, then, what matters in observership is not so much what people 
are reported to be doing with that technology at the moment (although that is not 
insignificant). Rather, what is important is a fuller picture of the potential of that 
technology for its users, an account of what James Gibson (1986) has called 
“affordances”. These affordances are all the opportunities in the environment 
which support particular kinds of functioning by particular animals with the 
sensory apparatus they possess. (Gibson [1986: 138] traces the origin of the 
concept to gestalt psychology but it seems to derive from Jakob von Uexküll’s 
[1980] work). Observation of such a technology and its uses therefore needs to 
embrace the potential uses of that technology rather than risk the sterility of an 
account of its reported uses in an observation process which not only misses 
potentiality but attempts to thicken ethnographic accounts through positing a one-
to-one relation to ‘culture’ (see Cobley and Haeffner 2009). 
 
The human sciences’ enslavement to ‘fact’ has meant that they are in perpetual 
pursuit of ‘context’. This is evident not just in the aspiration to ‘thick description’ 
but in anthropological ‘classics’ such as Malinowski’s (1923) essay on phatic 
union which call for rich contextual knowledge. This pursuit is not a problem in 
itself; after all, the notion of sign as a triadic relation is an exemplar of sign-in/as-
context. Yet, the context in question in semiotics is not simply rooted in the 
precise situation of semiosis. What is important is that observership is attuned to 
the potential engendered by the sign’s movement back and forth between mind-
dependent and mind-independent being. In a strongly Augustinian analysis, 
Brooke Williams (1983: 14-15) notes that the typical ways of viewing history as a 
relation between past and present often forget the tacit premise “that time exists as 
the finite human mind structures it, insofar as the historian’s object is past human 
experience”. A star’s existence in past solar time, therefore, does not preclude its 
existence in the present for some observers who receive its light ages later. In this 
instance, “solar time” is synonymous with a mind-independent reality – facts, 
neutral objects - when, in truth, the nature of the star and the retina of the eye is 
such as to make a field of light where, to a great extent, mind-dependent reality 
obtains. 
 
 
Conclusion 
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Semiotic research does not abrogate its responsibility to ‘fact’ in the general sense 
of what is ‘true’ and what has effectivity. Yet, with its theory of the sign, 
semiotics leads observership further: to a view of what could be - vis a prospecto 
causation. Cariani (1998: 4) states that a properly evolutionary semiotics “asks 
how a ‘sign’ becomes a ‘symbol, i.e. how new semiotic relations come into being 
(‘semiogenesis’). This involves both how existing relations are adaptively altered 
by experience (‘learning’), and how new sign-distinctions themselves might arise 
de novo (‘functional emergence’)”. This focus on new semiotic relations is also 
the basis on which semiotics can sustain itself institutionally. Traditional 
disciplines, with only a slightly more established place in the academy than 
semiotics, have implemented their institutional support to maintain confidence in  
their continued efforts catalyzing change and the growth of knowledge in the 
world. In fact, it is semiotics’ observership which truly effects change and greater 
knowing. Through its operation in a field where observership affects the object 
itself, semiotics has been a demonstrable catalyst for change. That has been 
witnessed in the last fifty years when semiotics transformed the landscape of the 
humanities and social sciences by calling in from the cold all the objects of 
observership which had hitherto been considered off radar to other disciplines. 
Without semiotics, it is unlikely that either popular culture or creative practice 
would have receiving anything approaching the attention that is now bestowed 
upon them by the global academy. Semioticians will – and must - continue to find 
new objects of observership and, in the process, change the future of knowing. 
 
As Williams (1983: 18) points out, the kind of observership in which Sebeok was 
embroiled when enlisted to ponder the problem of transmitting a sign to warn 
humankind ten thousand years from now of buried nuclear waste, exemplifies the 
future-orientation of semiotics: 
 
Even if the feat could be achieved in the mind-independent order of physical being 
– that is, even if the sign could survive physically – its signification would be 
constantly changing because of the mind-dependent contents forming part of the 
act of observation in the course of time.  
 
The field of semiosis is always in flux and the human observer (also a sign, as 
Peirce would have it), is likewise in flux. The semiotic observer’s alignment with 
that of the quantum observer arises from acts of observership on both sides of the 
exchange taking place not through a glass darkly but through a mutable field of 
interaction. In quantum and semiotic perspectives, observer and observed are not 
sustained as two mind-independent entities but, in the former, are implicated in a 
field of energy modification, and in the latter, are enmeshed in the field of 
semiosis, with the human participant oscillating between mind-independent and 
mind-dependent being. Hopefully, the point about mutual fields is clarified and 
not over-simplified in the following table: 
 
 
 Observes 
Newtonian   material points in time and space 
Relativity   phenomena relative to time 
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Quantum   in a modifying field 
Semiotic   in semiosis 
 
Observership involving only neutral objects constitutes an unrealistic expectation, 
both in the observation of human and non-human realms, although it may be 
possible in a limited fashion in respect of some machine observation of machines. 
Observing in a field of semiosis, with a participant observation in Thure von 
Uexküll’s terms, and with respect to the potential vis a prospecto causation, 
entails not just an observership derived from rational reconstruction of pre-
determined concepts of ‘culture’ and situation, but research which goes beyond 
rationality to consider possible emotions, motivations, interests, aspiration, 
affordances and potentials. It requires an acute sensitivity to sign usage, sign 
transformativity and potential, sign relations, modelling, first person experience of 
signs and the status of the sign at the moment of observation. It also calls for 
semioticians to keep their nerve in the face of ‘fact’ and that particular rationality 
which seems to rule that a “barrel of eels” could ever be seen or that a “barrel of 
concrete” (Wheeler with Ford, 1998: 330) was not the product of observership. 
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